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Abstract. A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heteroge-
neous services and resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider
to mobile cloud users. On one hand, some of these resources are substi-
tutable (e.g., users can use storage from different places) that they have
similar functions to the users. On the other hand, some resources are
complementary that the user will need them as a bundle (e.g., users need
both wireless connection and storage for online photo posting). In this
paper, we first model the resource allocation process of a mobile cloud
computing system as an auction mechanism with premium and discount
factors. The premium and discount factors indicate complementary and
substitutable relations among cloud resources provided by the service
provider. Then, we analyze the individual rationality and incentive com-
patibility (truthfulness) properties of the users in the proposed auction
mechanism. The optimal solutions of the resource allocation and cost
charging schemes in the auction mechanism is discussed afterwards.
Keywords: Mobile cloud computing, auction, mechanism design
1 Introduction
In a cloud computing system, the service provider has different resources to
be leased or sold to cloud users. The users use the allocated resources to run
their applications. A mobile cloud computing system differs from general cloud
computing systems in some aspects. One important aspect is the combination
pattern of demanded services. In a general cloud application, a cloud user may
request either a single service or a combination of services. For example, a user
of Amazon’s EC2 [1] may subscribe for a server only, or spend extra cost to
subscribe for other resources and services only when necessary. However, services
in a mobile cloud are generally provided in bundles. The reason is that a mobile
device as an end user is relatively a “thin client” which cannot process too
complex tasks. Therefore, most of the tasks are offloaded to the cloud side, and
the cloud service providers need to provide a bundle of service to process the
tasks. For example, in a mobile game service, the user will need both a processing
resource for artificial intelligent player and a storage for game module. Most
importantly, communication bandwidth, as crucial resource in mobile systems,
should be guaranteed for transferring data of mobile cloud applications.
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Fig. 1: Asymmetric scenario: (a) user 1’s utility to her type t1, (b) user 2’s utility to
user 1’s type t1, and (c) the service provider’s revenue to user 1’s type t1. Premium
and discount factors’ impacts: (d) user’s utility under different settings of premium
and discount factors.
In this paper, we model the resource allocation problem in a mobile cloud
system as a combinatorial auction with substitutable or complementary com-
modities. The service provider is defined as a seller, while the users are defined
as buyers. The available cloud resources are to be sold and allocated by the
seller to buyers. Moreover, we design the proposed auction mechanism for the
mobile cloud computing system, which is proved to be individual rational and
incentive compatible (as shown in Section 4.1). As shown in Fig. 1(a), the cloud
resources of the service provider can be categorized into several groups, e.g.,
processing (i.e., server), storage, and communication resources. Resources in the
same group are different in quality, but have similar functions. These heteroge-
neous resources can be allocated in bundles. Therefore, we consider the resources
as commodities which could be substitutable or complementary. If the resources
are substitutable, the valuations of these resources are sub-additive (i.e., total
valuation of all resources obtained altogether is less than the sum of valuation of
each resource). For example, any server can be treated by the user as a substi-
tutable resource. On the other hand, if the resources are complementary (e.g., a
server for processing and bandwidth for data transmission where the user needs
both), the valuations of these resources are super-additive (i.e., total valuation
of resources obtained altogether is higher than the sum of valuation of each
resource).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related
work. We describe the system model in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the
individual rationality and the incentive compatibility properties of cloud users.
Also, the optimal solutions of the service provider’s resource allocation and cost
charging schemes are presented. Section 5 shows the numerical results. Finally,
we conclude and summarize the paper in Section 6.
2 Related Work
In mobile cloud computing, the tasks of mobile applications will be partly of-
floaded to servers in cloud. Therefore, the performance of mobile applications
can be improved (e.g. computer games [2]). A few works addressed the issues of
general/mobile cloud computing systems. In [3], the definition and discussion of
general cloud computing systems were presented. [4] focused on cloud comput-
ing implemented on mobile network infrastructures, i.e., mobile cloud computing
systems. Also, [5] presented a comprehensive survey of mobile cloud computing
including the system architecture, applications, resource allocation and other
issues.
Auction is a general and effective way for resource allocation. A tutorial intro-
duction of auction theory for computer science was presented in [10]. Specifically,
[6] developed an auction mechanism for a single auction commodity scenario,
and proposed the concepts of individual rationality and incentive compatibil-
ity in auction mechanism designs. [7] extended the model in [6] to a multiple
commodity auction scenario. However the auction commodities in [7] are inde-
pendent with each other and indivisible. [8] discussed an auction model with two
complementary auction commodities. [9] explored the auction designs for sub-
stitutable commodities. [11] proposed an auction technique to optimize cloud
resource distribution in a cloud computing system. [12] proposed a second-price
auction mechanism to allocate a single type of cloud resource, i.e., computational
capacity.
To our best knowledge, the analytical auction model for a mobile cloud com-
puting system containing both complementary and substitutable resource was
not considered before.
3 System Model and Assumptions
In this section, we first present the description of the mobile cloud computing
system and auction mechanism. Then, the utility of users is defined.
3.1 Mobile Cloud Computing System and Auction Mechanism
We consider a mobile cloud computing system with a service provider offering
mobile cloud applications/services to N users (Fig. 1(a)). The service provider
has cloud resources (e.g., CPU/computational capacity, database, and commu-
nications) to support the offered services. There are totally M resources which
are divided into G groups. Group k contains Mk resources, for k = 1, 2, . . . , G. In
the same group, the resources provide similar functions, and hence the resources
are substitutable. On the other hand, in different groups, the resources provide
different functions, and hence the resources are complementary in building cloud
services for the users.
The substitutable and complementary resources in a mobile cloud computing
system is shown in Fig. 1(b) which is an abstracted model of Fig. 1(a). We assume
that the transitivity condition of the substitutable and complementary resources
holds, i.e.,
– Resources A, B and C are substitutable/complementary mutually, if and only
if, resources A and B, as well as B and C are substitutable/complementary.
– Resources A and C are complementary, if resources A and B are comple-
mentary, while resources B and C are substitutable.
By assuming the transitivity condition, there is no “triangle” relations among
any three resources A, B and C such that A and B are substitutable (in one
group), B and C are complementary (in different groups), but A and C are still
substitutable.
The auction mechanism is developed for resource allocation by the mobile
cloud service provider to the resource buyers (i.e., users). The auction mechanism
works as follows. First, the users submit bids containing users’ valuations on the
resources to the service provider. The valuation of user i on resource j is denoted
by vij . There are other users who also compete for the resources. Therefore, the
valuation depends not only on the type (i.e., preference) of user i, but also on
other users’ types. The user i’s type, denoted by ti, is defined as the user’s
private appetite on obtaining the resources. Therefore, the valuation is defined
as vij(ti), where t−i is the vector of other users’ types except that of user i and
t = (ti) = (t1, t2, . . . , tN ). The service provider receives the valuation but does
not know the user’s real type. After receiving the valuations for the resources
from all users, the service provider then optimizes the resource allocation to
maximize the revenue. The service provider sends back the allocation result
denoted by (p, c), where p is the set of all allocation pij , and c = {c1, c2, . . . , cN}
is the set of the costs charged to users. pij is the proportion of resource j allocated
to user i. ci(ti) denotes the cost charged by the service provider to user i. Again,
the cost is ultimately a function of user’s type. Formally, we define (p, c) as a
mechanism revealed by the service provider to all users.
3.2 User’s Utility
A user has a satisfaction on the allocated resources, which is referred to as the
utility. The expected utility of user i to obtain the resources from a group k of
substitutable resources can be defined as follows:
uk,si (p
k
i·, c
k
i , ti) = Et−i
{ Mk∑
r=1
pkir(ti)v
k
ir(ti)− li(ti)
Mk∑
r=1
pkir(ti)
}
− cki (ti) (1)
where ti is the type of user i, and ti ∈ [ti, ti]]. ti and ti are the lower bound and
upper bound of ti, respectively. In this case, we assume that the type of a user
is a random variable with cumulative distribution function (CDF) denoted by
F (ti) and probability density function (PDF) denoted by f(ti). CDF and PDF
are known knowledge or observations to the service provider. pkir denotes the
proportion of rth resource in group k allocated to user i. pki· is p
k
ir for all r. v
k
ir is
user i’s private valuation function on the rth resource of group k. We assume that
the valuation functions are positive, non-decreasing and concave with respect to
ti. c
k
i is the total cost function of all the resources in group k for user i. This
cost is paid by user i to the service provider. Note that li(ti)
∑Mk
r=1 p
k
ir(ti) in
(1) represents the sub-additive term of the substitutable resources. The sub-
additive term indicates the loss of utility of a user when multiple resources are
allocated from the same group of substitutable resources. Here li(ti) is defined
as a discount factor. For example, if the discount factor is large, the user has
more dissatisfaction on obtaining the resources from the same group.
Next, we consider the complementary resources and their contributions in the
utility function. First, we define the amount of aggregated resources allocated
from group k from the service provider as follows:
pk,c =
Mk∑
r=1
pkir(ti). (2)
Then, the total utility of user i from obtaining resources can be expressed as
follows:
ui(ti) = Et−i
{ G∑
k=1
uk,si (p
k
i·, c
k
i , ti) + hi(ti)
G∏
k=1
pk,c(ti)
}
(3)
where hi(ti)
∏G
k=1 p
k,c(ti) defined in (3) represents the super-additive term of the
complementary resources. hi(ti) is defined as a premium factor. If the premium
factor is large, the user has more satisfaction on obtaining the resources from
the different groups. Note that if the user has received nothing from merely
one group, the super-additive term will become zero, as a punishment of not
receiving a complete bundle of complementary resources required for a mobile
cloud computing service.
We will derive the total utility of all M resources next. We substitute (1) and
(2) into (3). In this case, the variables with k are mapped to the new variables
without k. The process is shown in Fig. 1(b). That is, the rth resource in group
k is mapped to the jth resource regardless of the group, where j =
∑k−1
i=1 Mk+r.
After mapping, pkir, v
k
ir and c
k
i become pij , vij and ci, respectively. pij , vij and
ci have the same definitions as those in Section 3.1. Then we can express the
utility ui(pi·, ci, ti) of the user i as follows:1
ui(ti) = Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
pij(ti)vij(ti) + Si(ti)
}
− ci(ti) (4)
where Si(ti, t−i) includes the premium and discount terms defined as follows:
Si(ti) = hi(ti)
G∏
k=1
∑k
n=1Mn∑
j=
∑k−1
n=1Mk+1
pij(ti)− li(ti)
M∑
j=1
pij(ti). (5)
1 The notation ui(ti) is used for short
We assume in our model that the valuation and extra premium and dis-
count information Si(ti, t−i) are sent to the service provider. Therefore, the first
term in (4) could be treated as user i’s “virtual valuation” with premium and
discount factors. Note, however, that the valuations submitted by users to the
service provider may not be the true valuations on the resources. For example,
to achieve a higher profit, user i who has the valuation vij(ti) on resource j
might actually submit a falsified valuation vij(tˆi) to the service provider as if
the user had the fake type tˆi. Only in the auction mechanism (p, c) that guar-
antees truthfulness, the users will choose to submit their true valuations as the
best bidding strategies. By sending an untruthful valuation, the user i’s utility
is
uˆi(tˆi|ti) = Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
pij(tˆi)vij(ti) + Si(tˆi)
}
− ci(tˆi). (6)
4 Analysis of the Auction Mechanism for Mobile Cloud
Computing System
In this section, the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility prop-
erties of the auction mechanism are analyzed. The optimization of the revenue
of the service provider is proposed. Also, the structure of the utility function is
discussed.
4.1 Individual Rationality and Incentive Compatibility
When an auction and resource allocation mechanism is designed, the auctioneer
must ensure positive payoffs of the auction participants (i.e., buyers), so that
those buyers are willing to join the auction market. On the other hand, the
mechanism should discourage the buyers to submit valuations which are not
based on the buyers’ true valuation. The individual rationality and incentive
compatibility (truthfulness) properties are defined as follows:
Individual rationality : ui(ti) ≥ 0
Incentive compatibility : ui(ti) ≥ uˆi(tˆi|ti).
(7)
Proposition 1. In the proposed auction for the substitutable and complemen-
tary resources in a mobile cloud computing system, a mechanism (p, c) is indi-
vidually rational and incentive compatible if and only if the following conditions
hold,
ui(ti) ≥ 0 (8)
ui(ti) = ui(ti) + Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
∫ ti
ti
∂vij(x)
∂ti
pij(x)dx
}
(9)
Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
ti∫
tˆi
∂vij(x)
∂ti
pij(x)dx
}
≥ Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
(
vij(ti)− vij(tˆi)
)
pij(tˆi)
}
. (10)
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the extended paper [13].
4.2 The Seller-side Problems: Revenue Maximization and Cost
Charging
The objective of the service provider is to sell and allocate available resources to
the users such that the revenue is maximized. The revenue of the service provider
is the sum of the cost ci(ti) that each user pays for the allocated resources. The
mechanism (i.e., resource allocation) is designed to maximize the total revenue
of the service provider, i.e.
∑N
i=1 Eti{ci(ti)}. The following proposition states
the optimal mechanism (i.e., maximizing the revenue of the service provider).
The following proposition is proved in [13].
Proposition 2. (p∗, c∗) is an optimal mechanism if p∗ maximizes
N∑
i=1
Et
{ M∑
j=1
(
vij(ti)− 1− F (ti)
f(ti)
∂vij(ti)
∂ti
)
pij(ti) + Si(ti)
}
(11)
subject to the constraints in (8), (9) and (10).
To achieve the optimal revenue, the (maximum) cost c∗i (ti) charged to each
user i can be obtained from
c∗i (ti) = Et
{ M∑
j=1
p∗ij(ti)vij(ti)−
M∑
j=1
ti∫
ti
∂vij(x)
∂ti
p∗ij(x)dx+ S
∗
i (ti)
}
. (12)
Note that the cost charging and revenue optimization as in Proposition 2 are
essentially linear programming problems, which can be solved numerically by
the service provider (seller), provided that the seller has the knowledge of CDF
and PDF of buyers’ types as we assumed in Section 3.2.
4.3 Structures of Utility and Revenue Functions
We analyze the structures of the users’ utility and the service provider’s optimal
revenue functions. According to (9), each user’s utility is only decided by the “ba-
sic utility” (i.e., ui(ti)), and the “marginal utility” (i.e., Et−i
{∑M
j=1
∫ ti
ti
∂vij(x)
∂ti
pij(x)dx
}
).
In the optimization process of the provider’s total revenue, as justified in
the proof of Proposition 2 ([13]), the basic utility is minimized to be zero by
the service provider’s resource allocation. Therefore, each user’s utility depends
solely on the marginal utility.
From another point of view, from the expression of
∑N
i=1 Eti{ui(ti)} in the
proof of Proposition 2 ([13]), the user’s optimal utility after the allocation can
be expressed as follows:
u∗i (ti) = Et
{ M∑
j=1
1− F (ti)
f(ti)
∂vij(ti)
∂ti
p∗ij(ti)
}
. (13)
As we have assumed, the valuation functions of users are non-decreasing and
concave. Therefore,
∂vij(ti)
∂ti
decreases with respect to ti. Then, the utility is
affected by 1−F (ti)f(ti) which is the distribution pattern of user’s type and p
∗
ij(ti)
which is the amount of resources allocated to the user.
For the service provider, the optimal revenue from selling resources can be
calculated by placing the optimal allocation p∗ into the revenue function defined
in (11). According to the second term in (11), the service provider’s revenue
is also affected by the marginal utility of the users. Moreover, the premium
and discount term (i.e., Si(ti)) affects the optimal revenue, depending on users’
choices of coefficients hi and li (see (5)).
In the following section, we will use examples and numerical results to support
the analyses of utility and revenue functions.
5 Example Scenarios and Numerical Results
In this section, we present examples and numerical simulation results of the
proposed auction model for the substitutable and complementary resources. We
discuss a model with two mobile cloud users for simplicity. The mobile cloud ser-
vice provides two servers for computational tasks, as well as two communication
channels to support different transmission rate (or bandwidth) requirements. We
consider a symmetric and an asymmetric scenarios. Then, we show the impact
caused by the premium and discount factors to the user’s utility and service
provider’s revenue.
Suppose there are four commodities to be auctioned belonging to the service
provider. Two of the resources are transmission channels for the buyers to choose
(i.e., transmission capacity) indexed as j = 1 and j = 2. The other two resources
are servers (i.e., commoditized computational capacity), indexed as j = 3 and
j = 4. Therefore, there are two complementary groups in the service provider,
each of the groups contains two substitutable resources, i.e., G = 2, and M1 =
M2 = 2 as shown in Fig. 1(b).
5.1 Example 1: A Basic Case
First we consider a basic case where buyers’ preferences on either complementary
or substitutable resources are zero. That is, ∀i, li(ti) ≡ hi(ti) ≡ 0. The optimal
mechanism (p∗, c∗) as in (12) and (11) reduces to
p∗ = arg max
p
2∑
i=1
Et
{ 4∑
j=1
(
vij(ti)− 1− F (ti)
f(ti)
∂vij(ti)
∂ti
)
pij(ti)
}
c∗i (ti) = Et
{ 4∑
j=1
p∗ij(ti)vij(ti)−
4∑
j=1
ti∫
ti
∂vij(x)
∂ti
p∗ij(x)dx
}
.
subject to (8), (9) and (10). As a result, the auction becomes a general single-
commodity auction case as in [6].
5.2 Example 2: A Symmetric Case
We consider a two-buyer, symmetric scenario as follows:
– In this symmetric case, we discuss the situation that the buyers’ valuations
on the first group of resources (j = 1, 2) are linear, i.e., vi1 = γi1ti and
vi2 = γi2ti. The expressions of vi1 and vi2 mean that user i’s valuation
on a communication channel (resources 1 and 2) is linear with respect to
the type. The relation between valuation functions and types indicates that
the valuation linearly increases as the buyers’ preference to the resources
(transmission bandwidth) increases.
– The buyers’ valuations on the second group of resources (j = 3, 4) are
increasing and concave functions of types (∂f(x)∂x ≥ 0 and ∂
2f(x)
∂x2 ≤ 0),
where the marginal payoffs decrease as the types increase. We consider
vi3 = log(1 + θi3/ti) and vi4 = log(1 + θi4/ti), i = 3, 4. Similarly, the type
ti in vi3 and vi4 represents user i’s preference on computational capacity
(i.e., servers). The intuition behind such concave valuations is that the cor-
responding resources might not be the main bottleneck of performance. As
a result, the buyers still prefer higher level resources but with less desire.
– User’s type ti is uniformly distributed from 0 to 1, for F (ti) = ti and f(ti) =
1. Also, the lower bound of ti is ti = 0 and upper bound of ti is ti = 1.
The optimal resource allocation p∗ as in (11) is optimized as follows:
p∗ = arg max
p
Et
{ 2∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
[
vij(ti) + (ti − 1)∂vij(ti)
∂ti
]
pij(ti)
+
2∑
i=1
hi
[
pi1(ti) + pi2(ti)
][
pi3(ti) + pi4(ti)
]− 2∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
li(ti)pij(ti)
}
.
(14)
From the allocation scheme defined in (14), we can see that the service provider
tends to adopt combinatorial allocation as the dominant strategy. That is, to
maximize the revenue, the service provider will allocate the whole group of re-
sources to a buyer, and another group of resources as a whole to another buyer.
5.3 Example 3: An Asymmetric Case
A simple asymmetric auction scenario is considered. The basic parameter set-
ting is the same as that of the symmetric scenario, except the users’ valuation
functions are heterogeneous, as follows:
– The valuation functions of user 1 are strictly concave. We assume in this
case that v11 = γ11
√
t1, v12 = γ12
√
t1, v13 =
√
t1 log(1 + θ13/
√
t1) and
v14 =
√
t1 log(1 + θ14/
√
t1).
– The valuation functions of user 2 are different from that of user 1, i.e.,
v21 = γ21t2, v22 = γ22t2, v23 = t2 log(1+θ23/t2) and v24 = t2 log(1+θ24b/t2).
We set in our examples that ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, γi1 = 10, γi2 = 20, θi3 = 1.25× 106
and θi4 = 3.75× 106.
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Fig. 2: Asymmetric scenario: (a) user 1’s utility to her type t1, (b) user 2’s utility to
user 1’s type t1, and (c) the service provider’s revenue to user 1’s type t1. Premium
and discount factors’ impacts: (d) user’s utility under different settings of premium
and discount factors.
– The distribution of type t1 is not uniform, i.e., F (t1) = (t1)
2 and f(t1) = 2t1,
where t1 ∈ [0, 1], while type t2’s distribution is still uniform over [0, 1].
We fix user 2’s type t2 at 0.6, and gradually increase user 1’s type t1 from 0
to 1. As shown in Figs. 2(a) and (b), when t1 is small, user 2 is the winner and
contributes a flat revenue to the service provider. When t1 increases, user 1’s
valuation may surpass that of user 2. User 1 becomes the winner after a turning
point (0.5 in this case). The decreasing of marginal utility causes the user 1’s
utility to decrease as in Fig. 2(a). Also, derived from (13), the utility of user 1
is convex after the turning point as shown in Fig. 2(a).
5.4 Impacts of Premium and Discount Factors
Fig. 2(c) resulted from the asymmetric scenario (Section 5.3) depicts the effects
of complementary and substitutable resources to the revenue of the cloud service
provider (i.e., seller). It is shown that the buyers will have extra utility on the
complements, so that the service provider’s revenue will increase according to
(11). Also, the existence of substitutable resources will decrease the total revenue.
In the examples, the premium and discount factors of users can be set in 3
different cases as follows:
– With both complementary and substitutable resources: h1 = h2 = 4 and
l1 = l2 = 1.5. In this case, the resources in the same group are substitutable
for the users with a discount factor of 1.5, and resources from different groups
are complementary with a premium factor of 4.
– With complementary resources only: h1 = h2 = 4 and l1 = l2 = 0. The
resources from different groups are complementary. However, the resources
from the same group are not substitutable.
– Without any complementary and substitutable resources: h1 = h2 = 0 and
l1 = l2 = 0.
From Fig. 2(d) we can compare the auction results given the different set-
tings of premium and discount factors. It is clear that the system with only
complementary resources has the optimal performance in terms of utilities of
users and revenue of the service provider, compared with other cases when other
settings are the same. This result is intuitive, since the premium factor of the
complementary resources increases the revenue of the service provider according
to (11). However, for the system with both complementary and substitutable re-
sources, and the system without any complementary and substitutable resources,
the results may vary, since the discount factor might degrade the performance.
For a user, the premium and discount factors can affect the resource al-
location done by the service provider. According to (11), the premium factor
increases the total revenue, so the service provider is in favor of allocating re-
sources to the user with a higher premium factor. For the discount factor, the
effect is just opposite. Fig. 2(d) shows the impact of premium and discount fac-
tors to the user 1’s utility. In this case, user 2’s type t2 is fixed at 0.6, and has
the premium and discount factors set as h2 = l2 = 0. Then, t1 increases from
0 to 1. The parameter setting is the same as that used in the symmetric sce-
nario except hi and li. Line 2 (see legend of Fig. 2(d)) is a reference result for
h1 = l1 = 0. It is shown by the figure that, a higher premium factor will increase
the user’s utility, and thus the total revenue is increased. The service provider
may allocate the resources to the user even the type of the user is relatively low.
Similarly, the existence of high discount factor will decrease the user’s chance of
being allocated with the resources.
6 Summary
In this paper, we have addressed an analytical auction model for the resource
allocation problem in a mobile cloud computing system. The complementary
and substitutable cloud resources have been considered. We have analyzed the
model, and solved the optimization problem to maximize the revenue of the
service provider given the proposed auction mechanism. From the numerical
results, we have found the changing of users’ utilities and the service provider’s
revenue with respect to users’ types, the optimal allocation schemes of the service
provider, and the impacts of users’ premium and discount factors to the users’
utilities and the service provider’s revenue.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. First, we show the situation when the mechanism (p, c) is individually
rational and incentive compatible. Replace ti with tˆi in (4) (i.e., we treat tˆi as
the true type, and vij(tˆi) as the user’s true valuation), i.e.,
ui(tˆi) = Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
pij(tˆi)vij(tˆi) + Si(tˆi)
}
− ci(tˆi). (15)
The incentive compatibility condition in (7) can be thus written as follows:
ui(ti) ≥ ui(tˆi) + Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
(
vij(ti)− vij(tˆi)
)
pij(tˆi)
}
. (16)
As the term Si(ti, t−i) and ci(ti) are canceled from both sides of (16), the
rest part of proof is similar to the procedure in [7]. We obtain
∂
∂ti
ui(x) = Et−i
{ M∑
j=1
∂vij(x)
∂ti
pij(x)
}
(17)
whose integral form can be expressed as in (9). Meanwhile, (16) and (9) imply
(10). Finally, (8) intuitively holds based on the individual rationality precondi-
tion.
Secondly, when the conditions in (8) to (10) hold, the individual rationality
property can be proved by (9) and (10) since we have assumed earlier that
vij ≥ 0 and it is a concave function to (ti). By replacing ti in (9) with any fake
type tˆi ∈ [ti, ti] (i.e., the user does not submit a real valuation), the incentive
compatibility property is proved. uunionsq
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. According to (4) and (5), we have the revenue of the service provider
expressed as follows:
N∑
i=1
Eti
{
ci(ti)
}
=
N∑
i=1
Et
{ M∑
j=1
pij(ti)vij(ti) + Si(ti)
}
− Eti
{ N∑
i=1
ui(ti)
}
(18)
where
N∑
i=1
Eti{ui(ti)} =
N∑
i=1
{
ui(ti) + Et
M∑
j=1
1− F (ti)
f(ti)
∂vij(ti)
∂ti
pij(ti)
}
. (19)
The result in (19) is derived from (9), as well as the derivation process (11)
in [7]. The integral term in (9) is transformed into a simple fraction term, if the
CDF and PDF of each user i’s type are known. After the transformation, the
expression of the utility is simplified.
Based on (18) and (19), the expression of the service provider’s total revenue
is,
N∑
i=1
Et
{ M∑
j=1
(
vij(ti)− 1− F (ti)
f(ti)
∂vij(ti)
∂ti
)
pij(ti)+Si(ti)
}
−
N∑
i=1
ui(pi·, ci, ti) (20)
where variable c = {c1, c2, . . . , cN} only appears in the last term of (20), i.e.,
ui(pi·, ci, ti). As a result, to maximize
∑N
i=1 Eti{ci(ti)}, the service provider con-
trols the cost c, such that the term ui(pi·, ci, ti) is zero which is the smallest possi-
ble value (see (8)). If
∑N
i=1 ui(pi·, ci, ti) = 0, (20) becomes the objective function
defined in (11). Thus we can solve for p∗ from the maximization problem (11).
Since the total revenue (11) is the sum of cost charged to each user, we also
obtain the the optimal charged cost to user i as in (12). uunionsq
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